Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael Tooley, Michael Stanford and Hamid Vahid

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23 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
12314 Audience-relative explanation, or metaphysical explanation based on information? [Stanford]
12313 Explanation is for curiosity, control, understanding, to make meaningful, or to give authority [Stanford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
12315 We can explain by showing constitution, as well as showing causes [Stanford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8388 Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
8389 Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8416 Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8393 We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8390 Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8418 Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
8392 Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
8399 The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8391 In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8394 Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
8398 Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]