16 ideas
18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
20992 | Right and wrong concerns what other people cannot reasonably reject [Scanlon] |
8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |