27 ideas
21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
8108 | Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner] |
8112 | Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner] |
8111 | Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner] |
8109 | Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner] |