15 ideas
8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |
16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |
8592 | Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker] |