39 ideas
10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
1212 | Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch] |
10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
5958 | The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch] |
5959 | Some philosophers say the soul is light [Plutarch] |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
5963 | Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch] |
20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
1477 | Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch] |
1478 | Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch] |
5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
1479 | Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch] |
5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
5974 | People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch] |
5957 | Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch] |
5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |