Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Moritz Schlick, Michael Devitt and Vann McGee

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
13737 The empiricist says that metaphysics is meaningless, rather than false [Schlick]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
18755 Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18751 Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18761 Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18753 An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18754 Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
18757 Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
18760 The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18762 A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]