14 ideas
13737 | The empiricist says that metaphysics is meaningless, rather than false [Schlick] |
3338 | Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn] |
13949 | All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano] |
18113 | PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock] |
17634 | Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell] |
5897 | 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew] |
15653 | We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano] |
17635 | Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |