191 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
8828 | Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam] |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
10066 | Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
17699 | Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel] |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
3663 | How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13858 | The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |
5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |