33 ideas
17699 | Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17368 | Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt] |
17370 | Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
19565 | How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt] |
9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
19564 | Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17369 | We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt] |
17367 | Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |