18 ideas
| 17699 | Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel] |
| 8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
| 8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
| 8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
| 8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
| 8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
| 8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
| 4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
| 14369 | Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens] |
| 14365 | Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens] |
| 14368 | We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens] |
| 8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
| 8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
| 8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |