20 ideas
20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
23395 | Mohists desire wealth, population and social order as the best consequences [Mozi, by Norden] |
23394 | If people regarded other states as they did their own, they would never attack them [Mozi] |
23396 | Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi] |
23397 | Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi] |