Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mozi, Thomas Nagel and New Scientist writers

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134 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel]
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Mohists desire wealth, population and social order as the best consequences [Mozi, by Norden]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
If people regarded other states as they did their own, they would never attack them [Mozi]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi]
Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi]
The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel]
In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel]
The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]
Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel]
Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]