15 ideas
| 21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
| 6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| 23395 | Mohists desire wealth, population and social order as the best consequences [Mozi, by Norden] |
| 23394 | If people regarded other states as they did their own, they would never attack them [Mozi] |
| 23396 | Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi] |
| 23397 | Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi] |