Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mulligan/Simons/Smith, DH Mellor / T Crane and Max J. Cresswell

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17 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10911 Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10909 Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10906 Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10907 The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10912 Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
10908 Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
14970 Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
14971 D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14972 S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14973 In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
14976 Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
7855 Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
14974 A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14975 A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
6120 Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
6121 There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]