Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Mulligan/Simons/Smith, Joseph Butler and E Sosa / M Tooley

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10911 Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10909 Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10906 Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10907 The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10912 Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
10908 Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3144 Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
21315 A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
8329 Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
21317 Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21313 If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21314 Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
21318 If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
8066 Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8324 The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8328 Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
8327 If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8330 Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8325 The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]