Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Myles F. Burnyeat, Daniel M. Mittag and John Etchemendy

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9 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read]
Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat]