225 ideas
20866 | Wise men participate in politics, especially if it shows moral progress [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
20854 | Wise men are never astonished at things which other people take to be wonders [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20815 | No wise man has yet been discovered [Stoic school, by Cicero] |
20806 | Stoic physics concerns cosmos, elements and causes (with six detailed divisions) [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20839 | Ethics studies impulse, good, passion, virtue, goals, value, action, appropriateness, encouragement [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20867 | True philosophising is not memorising ideas, but living by them [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
21675 | Some facts are indispensable for an effect, and others actually necessitate the effect [Stoic school, by Cicero] |
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
20775 | Stoics study canons, criteria and definitions, in order to find the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
21393 | Stoics believed that rational capacity in man (logos) is embodied in the universe [Stoic school, by Long] |
21810 | The Stoics distinguished spoken logos from logos within the mind [Stoic school, by Plotinus] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
20776 | Dialectics is mastery of question and answer form [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20849 | Falsehoods corrupt a mind, producing passions and instability [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20823 | The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
20778 | Stoics like syllogisms, for showing what is demonstrative, which corrects opinions [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
21400 | Stoics avoided universals by paraphrasing 'Man is...' as 'If something is a man, then it is...' [Stoic school, by Long] |
20788 | The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
21594 | Stoics applied bivalence to sorites situations, so everyone is either vicious or wholly virtuous [Stoic school, by Williamson] |
20824 | Stoics have four primary categories: substrates, qualities, dispositions, relative dispositions [Stoic school, by Simplicius] |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
20817 | Platonic Forms are just our thoughts [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
6037 | Stoics say matter has qualities, and substance underlies it, with no form or qualities [Stoic school, by Chalcidius] |
20826 | How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school] |
20825 | How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school] |
20872 | Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
20790 | A proposition is possible if it is true when nothing stops it being true [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
20789 | Conditionals are false if the falsehood of the conclusion does not conflict with the antecedent [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
20783 | Knowledge is a secure grasp of presentations which cannot be reversed by argument [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20868 | Two sorts of opinion: either poorly grounded belief, or weak belief [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
20784 | There are non-sensible presentations, which come to us through the intellect [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20803 | Stoics say we are born like a blank sheet of paper; the first concepts on it are sensations [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch] |
6025 | At birth the soul is a blank sheet ready to be written on [Stoic school, by Aetius] |
20781 | Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
20792 | Stoic perception is a presentation to which one voluntarily assents [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
20805 | All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20782 | Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
1772 | For Stoics knowledge is an assertion which never deviates from the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20779 | Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
23251 | The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
20809 | Eight parts of the soul: five senses, seeds, speech and reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
23321 | Division of the soul divides a person, reducing responsibility for the nonrational part [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
23267 | Stoics say the soul is a mixture of air and fire [Stoic school, by Galen] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
20785 | Our conceptions arise from experience, similarity, analogy, transposition, composition and opposition [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
7502 | For Stoics the true self is defined by what I can be master of [Stoic school, by Foucault] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
23327 | Stoics expanded the idea of compulsion, and contracted what counts as one's own actions [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
7672 | The free will problem was invented by the Stoics [Stoic school, by Berlin] |
23315 | The nearest to ancient determinism is Stoic fate, but that is controlled by a sympathetic God [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
4014 | Stoics classify passions according to the opinion of good and bad which they imply [Stoic school, by Taylor,C] |
23988 | There are four basic emotions: pleasure or delight, distress, appetite, and fear [Stoic school, by Cicero] |
6594 | Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth [Stoic school, by Fogelin] |
20804 | Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch] |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
20786 | Predicates are incomplete 'lekta' [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
23322 | Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
20777 | Rhetoric has three types, four modes, and four sections [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
23323 | Earlier Stoics speak of assent, but not of choice, let alone of a will [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
4377 | Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat] |
23305 | Stoics said responsibility depends on rationality [Stoic school, by Sorabji] |
1907 | Stoics use 'kalon' (beautiful) as a synonym for 'agathon' (good) [Bury on Stoic school] |
22757 | Stoics say that folly alone is evil [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20846 | Prime values apply to the life in agreement; useful values apply to the natural life [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20847 | The appraiser's value is what is set by someone experienced in the facts [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20870 | The goal is to live consistently with the constitution of a human being [Stoic school, by Clement] |
22238 | Stoics said health is an 'indifferent', but they still considered it preferable [Stoic school, by Pormann] |
20861 | The health of the soul is a good blend of beliefs [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
3553 | Stoic morality says that one's own happiness will lead to impartiality [Stoic school, by Annas] |
20851 | Virtuous men do not feel sexual desire, which merely focuses on physical beauty [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
7499 | Stoicism was an elitist option to lead a beautiful life [Stoic school, by Foucault] |
20843 | Final goods: confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment and no pain, good spirits, virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
22753 | Happiness for the Stoics was an equable flow of life [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20865 | Happiness is the end and goal, achieved by living virtuously, in agreement, and according to nature [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
20840 | Stoics say pleasure is at most a byproduct of finding what is suitable for us [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20852 | Rapture is a breakdown of virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
6895 | If humans are citizens of the world (not just a state) then virtue is all good human habits [Stoic school, by Mautner] |
20848 | An appropriate action is one that can be defended, perhaps by its consistency. [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20844 | Honour is just, courageous, orderly or knowledgeable. It is praiseworthy, or functions well [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
4012 | The Stoics rejected entirely the high value that had been placed on contemplation [Stoic school, by Taylor,C] |
5073 | Stoics do not despise external goods, but subject them to reason, and not to desire [Taylor,R on Stoic school] |
20862 | Crafts like music and letters are virtuous conditions, and they accord with virtue [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
5072 | For Stoics, obligations are determined by social role [Taylor,R on Stoic school] |
21396 | Man is distinguished by knowing conditional truths, because impressions are connected [Stoic school, by Long] |
1781 | Stoics favour a mixture of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
21384 | The Stoics saw the whole world as a city [Stoic school, by Long] |
20859 | The best government blends democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
3561 | Stoics originated the concept of natural law, as agreed correct reasoning [Stoic school, by Annas] |
20858 | Suicide is reasonable, for one's country or friends, or because of very bad health [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
3046 | Stoics say a wise man will commit suicide if he has a good enough reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
3556 | Stoic 'nature' is deterministic, physical and teleological [Stoic school, by Annas] |
22743 | Unlike Epicurus, Stoics distinguish the Whole from the All, with the latter including the void [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
13296 | The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca] |
5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
20827 | The cosmos is regularly consumed and reorganised by the primary fire [Stoic school, by Aristocles] |
7815 | Early Stoics called the logos 'god', meaning not a being, but the principle of the universe [Stoic school] |
6038 | Stoics say god is matter, or an inseparable quality of it, or is the power within it [Stoic school, by Chalcidius] |
20829 | Virtuous souls endure till the end, foolish souls for a short time, animal souls not at all [Stoic school, by Eusebius] |
6039 | Stoics say virtuous souls last till everything ends in fire, but foolish ones fade away [Stoic school, by ] |