Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for New Scientist writers, Cynthia Macdonald and Philippa Foot

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193 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot]
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]