Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for New Scientist writers, David J.Chalmers and Edward N. Zalta

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


128 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer]
Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]