90 ideas
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
7127 | If men are good you should keep promises, but they aren't, so you needn't [Machiavelli] |
6309 | The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies [Machiavelli] |
6306 | People are vengeful, so be generous to them, or destroy them [Machiavelli] |
6305 | To retain a conquered state, wipe out the ruling family, and preserve everything else [Machiavelli] |
6308 | A sensible conqueror does all his harmful deeds immediately, because people soon forget [Machiavelli] |
6307 | A desire to conquer, and men who do it, are always praised, or not blamed [Machiavelli] |
7486 | Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion [Machiavelli, by Watson] |
19813 | All legislators invoke God in support of extraordinary laws, because their justification is not obvious [Machiavelli] |
7126 | Rulers should preserve the foundations of religion, to ensure good behaviour and unity [Machiavelli] |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |