Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Niccolo Machiavelli, Stephen Read and Susan A. Gelman

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90 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / g. Von Neumann numbers
Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
If men are good you should keep promises, but they aren't, so you needn't [Machiavelli]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies [Machiavelli]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
People are vengeful, so be generous to them, or destroy them [Machiavelli]
To retain a conquered state, wipe out the ruling family, and preserve everything else [Machiavelli]
A sensible conqueror does all his harmful deeds immediately, because people soon forget [Machiavelli]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
A desire to conquer, and men who do it, are always praised, or not blamed [Machiavelli]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion [Machiavelli, by Watson]
All legislators invoke God in support of extraordinary laws, because their justification is not obvious [Machiavelli]
Rulers should preserve the foundations of religion, to ensure good behaviour and unity [Machiavelli]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]