Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Nicholas Hill, Democritus and Thomas Aquinas

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


164 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas]
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas]
Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas]
One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus]
Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus]
Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero]
Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius]
The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas]
Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero]
Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas]
Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas]
We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas]
Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas]
Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas]
Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas]
Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle]
There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus]
The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen]
If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus]
'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg]
Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle]
If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus]
Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus]
Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus]
Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas]
Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas]
Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas]
Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas]
Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji]
If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas]
It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas]