Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Nicolas Malebranche, Andrew Bowie and Jonathan Kvanvig

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
20955 Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16669 Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22049 Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
20950 German Idealism says our thinking and nature have the same rational structure [Bowie]
22055 The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
22054 German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
22056 Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
20942 Nazis think race predetermines the self [Bowie]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
20946 Rhetoric is built into language, so it cannot be stripped from philosophy [Bowie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
12726 In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
2594 A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]