17 ideas
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |
2594 | A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche] |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |