Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Nicolas Malebranche, John Locke and David Hume

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500 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposition to reason is mad [Locke]
Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume]
All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke]
It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke]
If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke]
Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke]
Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke]
We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existences can only be known by experience [Locke]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke]
If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke]
We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke]
We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke]
Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume]
There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke]
Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke]
Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke]
If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume]
A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume]
If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
There is no such thing as chance [Hume]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume]
Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke]
Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G]
Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke]
General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke]
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley]
If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke]
A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke]
Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke]
The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke]
The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke]
We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley]
Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke]
Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke]
In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil]
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume]
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume]
All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke]
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume]
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume]
All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume]
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke]
Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke]
The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke]
Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume]
All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume]
The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke]
We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume]
Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume]
How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume]
You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume]
When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume]
We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J]
Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume]
Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant]
If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume]
Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke]
Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume]
Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume]
Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume]
The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume]
Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke]
The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke]
Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke]
The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke]
General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume]
If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume]
An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke]
'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke]
My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Nothing about me is essential [Locke]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume]
When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume]
We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume]
Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume]
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke]
The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke]
A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke]
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke]
Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke]
Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke]
Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke]
Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume]
Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Forget about beauty; just concentrate on the virtues of delicacy and discernment admired in critics [Hume, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice, comparisons, and lack of prejudice, are all needed for good taste [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume]
Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke]
Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke]
Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C]
The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume]
You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume]
Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke]
We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education [Hume]
There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke]
The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke]
There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke]
The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton]
A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke]
If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke]
A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke]
The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience [Hume]
We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep [Hume]
The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke]
You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke]
Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume]
Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke]
Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke]
People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke]
Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke]
Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke]
If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke]
The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke]
Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke]
A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 7. Freedom to leave
Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]
All value depends on the labour involved [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property [Hume]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke]
There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin]
Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke]
A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke]
If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke]
Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke]
Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke]
Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke]
It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke]
Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Hume, by Fogelin]
We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices [Hume]
It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government [Hume]
A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke]
Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke]
Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke]
Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
If suicide is wrong because only God disposes of our lives, it must also be wrong to save lives [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke]
We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume]
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume]
Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]
Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume]
Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume]
A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume]
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume]
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P]
The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke]
We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke]
Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P]
An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke]
The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume]
No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke]
A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume]
If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume]
Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume]
How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume]
Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume]
The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume]
From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume]
If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume]
Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume]
From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume]
Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume]
This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume]
Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume]
This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume]
Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume]
Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume]
The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume]
Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume]
A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume]
If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke]
It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume]
All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume]
To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume]