Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Nicolas Malebranche, Michael Devitt and Anon (Par)

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23 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)]