17 ideas
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
19691 | Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm] |
19690 | 'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm] |
19692 | You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
1422 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm] |