34 ideas
2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
16362 | An identity statement aims at getting the hearer to merge two mental files [Lockwood] |
2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
4054 | I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood] |
4056 | If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood] |
4055 | It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood] |
2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |
1422 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory [Malcolm] |