Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Novalis, Edouard Machery and R Kaplan / E Kaplan

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89 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Using Choice, you can cut up a small ball and make an enormous one from the pieces [Kaplan/Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
1 and 0, then add for naturals, subtract for negatives, divide for rationals, take roots for irrationals [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The rationals are everywhere - the irrationals are everywhere else [Kaplan/Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
'Commutative' laws say order makes no difference; 'associative' laws say groupings make no difference [Kaplan/Kaplan]
'Distributive' laws say if you add then multiply, or multiply then add, you get the same result [Kaplan/Kaplan]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery]
For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery]
A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis]
Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery]
Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery]
If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery]
'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Every person has his own language [Novalis]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis]