130 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
8972 | What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13858 | The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
6981 | Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson] |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
7101 | Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman] |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |