56 ideas
| 19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
| 19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
| 22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
| 19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
| 19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
| 19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
| 19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
| 19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
| 19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
| 19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
| 19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
| 22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
| 16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
| 16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
| 16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
| 19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
| 16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
| 2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |
| 7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
| 19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
| 19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
| 19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
| 19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
| 19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
| 19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
| 19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
| 22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
| 19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
| 19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
| 19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
| 19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
| 19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
| 19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |