85 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
16415 | Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber] |
16413 | Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber] |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
16416 | The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber] |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |