Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Novalis, Timothy McGrew and Stephen Mumford

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112 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Every person has his own language [Novalis]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis]