96 ideas
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| 19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
| 19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
| 19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| 19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| 19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
| 12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
| 12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
| 8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
| 8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
| 21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
| 21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
| 21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
| 19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
| 19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
| 19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| 8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| 17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
| 12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
| 12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| 12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| 12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
| 12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
| 12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
| 12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
| 12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
| 12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| 5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
| 5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
| 5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
| 5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
| 5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
| 5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
| 6011 | There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara] |