39 ideas
| 14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
| 14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
| 19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
| 19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
| 22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
| 22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
| 22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
| 22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
| 22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
| 22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
| 22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
| 22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
| 22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
| 22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
| 22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
| 22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
| 22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
| 22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
| 22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
| 22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
| 22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
| 22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
| 22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
| 22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
| 22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
| 22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |