37 ideas
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
19896 | It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R] |
19891 | Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R] |
19897 | Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R] |
17005 | Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R] |