Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Oliver,A/Smiley,T, William Lyons and David O. Brink

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
14239 The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley]
14240 The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley]
14241 We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley]
14242 Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
14243 The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14234 If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley]
14237 We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
14245 Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
14246 If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
14247 Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
2986 Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2978 Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2984 Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2979 Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2987 Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2977 All thinking has content [Lyons]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2848 Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
2851 Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
2853 Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
2852 Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
2849 Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
2850 How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]