39 ideas
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
10247 | We have no adequate logic at the moment, so mathematicians must create one [Veblen] |
14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
18648 | Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20585 | If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick] |
18643 | A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick] |
18642 | Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick] |
18644 | States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick] |
22661 | My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick] |
18641 | If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20521 | Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick] |
20539 | Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift] |
18645 | Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
18646 | How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
18647 | If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
21737 | Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick] |
21738 | Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick] |