28 ideas
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
| 6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
| 10247 | We have no adequate logic at the moment, so mathematicians must create one [Veblen] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
| 14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
| 12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
| 14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
| 14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
| 14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
| 14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
| 12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
| 14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
| 12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
| 12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
| 12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |