27 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
10247 | We have no adequate logic at the moment, so mathematicians must create one [Veblen] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |