Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for PG, Bryan van Norden and John Searle

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330 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
Aletheia: truth [PG]
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
Ananke: necessity [PG]
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
Chronismos: separation [PG]
Diairesis: division [PG]
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
Diaphora: difference [PG]
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
Empeiron: experience [PG]
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
Enkrateia: control [PG]
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
Ergon: function [PG]
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
Eros: love [PG]
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
Genos: type, genus [PG]
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
Horismos: definition [PG]
Hule: matter [PG]
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
Meson: the mean [PG]
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
Morphe: form [PG]
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
Orexis: desire [PG]
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
Philia: friendship [PG]
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
Physis: nature [PG]
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
Theos: god [PG]
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
To ti estin: essence [PG]
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
347: death of Plato [PG]
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]