344 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
18832 | Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
14235 | Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
15938 | Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
15939 | For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
15049 | Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |