Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Parmenides, Amphis and Nathan Salmon

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63 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1502 Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
18889 Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14627 S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
449 Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
448 No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
447 Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
445 The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
1503 There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21820 Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
452 All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
14742 It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
18888 Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1504 Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
444 The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
450 Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
451 Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
1506 Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3058 Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18887 The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
18885 Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
3032 I can form no notion of what the good is [Amphis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
555 People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
226 The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
5081 There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
1509 The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
20900 Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
1505 Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
453 Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
1792 He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
18891 Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
5115 It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
13217 The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22918 What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1794 He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
1791 He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]