189 ideas
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
10632 | The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |