41 ideas
19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |