Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Audi, Joseph Melia and Michael Martin

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
6855 Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5750 Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
6856 Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
5737 Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
5744 First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
5740 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
5741 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17292 Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
17295 Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
17297 A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
17302 Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
17303 The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17294 Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
17300 If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17296 We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17301 Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
5736 No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
5735 Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
17293 Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
5746 The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
5738 We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
5732 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
5739 Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
5734 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
5742 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
5743 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
5749 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
5751 The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6857 An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17298 Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17299 There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5748 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]