Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Audi, Mark Rowlands and George Santayana

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
8000 He who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it [Santayana, by MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
6161 Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
6163 If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18521 The criterion of existence is the possibility of action [Santayana]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17292 Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
17295 Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
17297 A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
17302 Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
17303 The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17294 Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
17300 If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17296 We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17301 Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
6155 Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
17293 Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
6157 Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
6159 Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17298 Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17299 There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
6152 Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
6173 Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
6174 If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
6158 Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6168 The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
6167 Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6177 Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23060 The good is not relative, but is rooted in facts about human needs [Santayana]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
6156 The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6170 Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
6178 It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]