57 ideas
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
9935 | Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf] |
13412 | Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf] |
13413 | We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf] |
9912 | There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf] |
9901 | Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf] |
13411 | If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf] |
9151 | Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K] |
13891 | To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C] |
17904 | A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf] |
17906 | To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf] |
9898 | We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf] |
17903 | Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf] |
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
9897 | The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf] |
9900 | For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf] |
9899 | The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf] |
8697 | Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend] |
8304 | No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe] |
9906 | If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf] |
13415 | An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf] |
9907 | If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf] |
9908 | The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf] |
9909 | The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf] |
9911 | Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf] |
8925 | Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf] |
9938 | How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam] |
9910 | Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf] |
17927 | Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan] |
9936 | The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf] |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
9903 | Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf] |
9904 | The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf] |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
9905 | Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf] |
19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
14629 | If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn] |
14529 | If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
11911 | Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn] |
2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
23223 | The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn] |