Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Bernays, Alain Badiou and Amie L. Thomasson

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou]
There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou]
Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou]
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou]
Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou]
The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou]
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou]