Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Paul Bernays, Charlotte Witt and Peter Forrest

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11 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17962 The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10304 Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10303 Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10306 Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12082 If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12089 Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12102 Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15432 Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12085 Reality is directional [Witt]