18 ideas
| 19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
| 19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
| 19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
| 19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
| 19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
| 19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
| 19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
| 19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| 19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
| 19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| 11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
| 11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
| 11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
| 11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
| 11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |